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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
H. ~L GRIBBLE, 
Plaintiff am,d AppeUant, 
vs. 
~IRS. E~l~IA COWLEY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 6224 
Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT 
This is an appeal by appellant, H. ~I. Gribble, 
plaintiff below, from a judgment made and entered in 
the Seventh District Court of San Pete County, Utah, 
on September 27, 1938, and made final on the 19th day 
of June, 1939, by the order of said Court overruling 
the motion of said plaintiff for a new trial of said 
action. 
William Hale Gribble, age fourteen years, was a 
resident of Gunnison, Utah, and was a student at the 
Gunnison High School. On the 13th day of December, 
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1937, the said William Hale Gribble was riding his 
bicycle home after school, and had been riding on the 
dirt sidewalk on the East side of Highway No 89, as 
the said highway approached the San Pitch Bridge, pro-
ceeding in a Northerly direction, and as said decedent 
approached the Bridge, he came off of the sidewalk, as 
the said highway and sidewalk converged at the Bridge, 
and on the main highway, still proceeding in a North-
erly direction. He was approximately half-way between 
the North and South extremities of the Bridge, and be-
tween one and one-half and two feet from the East edge 
of the Bridge, when the defendant driving her auto-
mobile in the same direction as the decedent was pro-
ceeding, · struck the bicycle of the decedent, throwing 
him into the air and North of the point of impact. The 
decedent was struck in such a way that a severe head 
injury at the rear of the head was inflicted, and upon 
being taken to the doctor's office in Gunnison, he re-
mained there until he was brought to Salt Lake for 
attention at the hospital, where he died on the morning 
of the 15th day of December, 1937. 
The action was commenced by the serving of sum-
mons and the filing of a complaint against the defendant 
on the 18th day of March, 1938, and in the complaint 
defendant was sued for damages based on the negli-
gence of the defendant herein described. The defendant 
filed an answer to the complaint admitting that she 
was at the scene of the accident on the day alleged in 
the complaint; that she admitted that the automobile 
which she was driving and operating did strike upon 
and' against the body and bicycle of William Hale 
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Gribble; that \Yilliam Hale Gribble was by reason there-
of thrown and hurled a considerable distance; that upon 
the 15th day of December, 1937, the said William Hale 
Gribble died from injuries received thereof; but denied 
that she was at the time operating or driving her auto-
mobile carelessly or negligently, or at a great, excessive 
or unlawful rate of speed, or that she carelessly or neg-
ligently failed to keep a careful, or any lookout for per-
sons along or upon said highway, or that she carelessly 
or negligently failed to have said automobile under con-
trol, or that she failed to observe any traffic rule or 
regulation required by la-w. The effect of the answer 
of the defendant is simply to deny the negligence alleged 
in the complaint and there is no defense in this action 
of contributory negligence. 
The case was tried to a jury starting on the 22nd 
day of September, 1938, upon the complaint and answer 
filed in this action, and the jury returned a verdict for 
the defendant, "no cause of action," in the early morn-
ing of September 27, 1938. (Ab. 14). 
The plaintiff within time filed his motion for a 
new trial. (Ab. 15-16). 
In support of his first ground for granting the new 
trial, ''misconduct of the jury,'' the plaintiff secured 
and served upon counsel for the defendant, and filed 
with the Clerk of the Court, the affidavits of two persons, 
namely: Mrs. Gladys Nielson and Mrs. H. M. Gribble 
(Ab. 16-18). Both affidavits were to the effect that 
statements were made in the jury room that even though 
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the plaintiff, H. M. Gribble, was entitled to recover, Hale 
Gribble was more negligent than Mrs. Cowley at the 
scene of the accident, and that the plaintiff because of 
the negligence of said Hale Gribble, was not entitled 
to recover. Further statements were made that the 
cause of the accident was the negligence of Hale Gribble 
turning into the car of Mrs. Emma Cowley. (Ab 16-18). 
Plaintiff's motion for new trial was argued and 
on the 19th day of June, 1939, the Court denied plain-
tiff's motion for a new trial. (Ab. 19). 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
The errors of the trial court upon which the plain-
tiff .relies for a reversal of this case are- as follows: 
I. 
The evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict 
in the following particulars: 
That there was no issue of contributory negligence 
in this trial; that the jury were instructed that the sole 
issue in the cause was whether or not the defendant was 
negligent as alleged in plaintiff's complaint; and that 
there was no evidence of negligence on the part of 
William Hale Gribble, the decedent, which said negli-
gence might be imputed to his father, the plaintiff in 
this action. 
II. 
Misconduct of the jury in the following particulars: 
4 
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(a) Considering· in the jury room and discussing 
the negligenee of the defendant and the contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff's deceased son, when the Court 
had given Instruction X o. 14, which instruction stated 
that the sole issue in the ea use was the negligence of 
the defendant. 
(b) That the jury In their jury room discussion 
stated that the defendant was guilty of negligence in 
causing the death of the decedent, and by deciding that 
the defendant, ~Irs. Cowley, was negligent, it then be-
came the duty for the jury to determine just one matter, 
to-wit: what amount of damages was sustained by the 
plaintiff and render a verdict in that amount. 
(c) That the jury considered facts outside of the 
scope of the pleadings and trial, namely: contributory 
negligence of the decedent, when the sole issue in the 
case was the negligence only of the defendant. 
(d) That the jury sent word to the Judge in the 
cause that they wished further instructions in the case, 
and upon being informed that the jury were to read 
the instructions and decide the case accordingly, the 
jury voted on the verdict and three jurors changed their 
verdict, so that the vote was eight to nothing for "no 
cause of action," and that the last vote of the jurors 
was influenced by the information sent to the jury by 
the Judge in the cause. (Ab. 65-66). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
DENIAL OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
The court erred in refusing plaintiff's motion for 
new trial for the following reasons : 
The pleadings fix the issues to be determined in 
the cause as submitted to the jury as to the evidence 
adduced at the trial. The complaint alleges that the 
defendant was negligent in driving and operating her 
automobile carelessly and negligently, and at a great, 
excessive and unlawful rate of speed, to-wit: in excess 
of 40 miles per hour; that she negligently failed to keep 
a careful or any lookout for any persons along and upon 
said highway; that she failed to have her automobile 
under control and drove and operated said automobile 
to the right hand side of the hig~way, and negligently 
failed to give any signal whatsoever of her intention 
to pass said deceased on his left, and in passing said 
decedent, failed to proceed as required by law and or-
dinances of the City of Gunnison with reference to speed, 
sounding of horn and distance of passing on the left. 
The defendant entered a general denial of the acts of 
negligence alleged by the plaintiff, and did not set up 
any plea of contributory negligence of the decedent which 
could be imputed to the plaintiff in this case. 
A 
PLEA OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
NECESSARY, UNLESS PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE 
SHOWS NEGLIGENCE. 
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In the cast:> of Smith vs. Ogden & N. TJ'". R. Co., 33 
Utah 1~9; 93 Par. 185, Justice Straup at page 136 of the 
Utah Report says: 
''The rule obtains in this jurisdiction that 
the plaintiff is not required to allege nor prove 
in the first instance his freedom from negligence. 
He is required to allege and prove negligence on 
the part of the defendant, and that such negli-
gence, as a natural and direct result, occasioned 
the injury. The burden of proving contributory 
negligence is upon the defendant, unless it is 
shown by plaintiff's evidence.'' 
The court further says at page 137: 
"If there is no evidence either on the part 
of the plaintiff or the defendant on such issue, 
the court should not submit that issue to the 
jury anymore that it should submit any other 
issue to them upon which there is no evidence. 
''A plea of contributory negligence is es-
sential onlv to entitle the defendant to intro-
duce evidence in support of such a defense. The 
general denial puts in issue such of the general 
averments of the complaint as the plaintiff is 
bound to prove in order to maintain his action. 
Under the general issue, the defendant may intro-
duce any evidence which tends to disprove the 
negligence charged against him, or which tends to 
disprove the casual connection of his negligence 
and the injury; but a plea of contributory negli-
gence is essential to entitle the defendant to intro-
duce evidence which does not tend to disprove 
such facts, but which merely tends to prove neg-
ligence on plaintiff's part, concurring and com-
bining with the defendant's negligence, and as a 
proximate cause contributing to plaintiff's in-
jury. That is to say, the defendant, under the 
general issue, may not introduce evidence which 
does not tend to disprove his negligence or its 
('asual conneetion, or the averments essential to 
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plaintiff's recovery but which, nevertheless, tends 
to relieve him of the legal consequences of his 
negligence. To do so a special plea is necessary." 
The court further says at page 138: 
''But the defendant, under the general issue, 
may not show that the plaintiff was guilty of 
what in law is termed 'contributory negligence.' 
* * * For these reasons the general rule obtains 
that the defense of contributory negligence is not 
available as a defense, if not specially pleaded, 
unless plaintiff's evidence discloses such negli-
gence.'' 
In the case of Andreason vs. Ogden Railway and 
Depot Company, 8 Utah 128, Justice Anderson at page 
132 says: 
''The question of the negligence of the re-
spective parties was a question which it was the 
special province of the jury to determine under 
proper instructions from the Court.'' 
The question of contributory negligence in this case 
was not within the scope of the functions of the jury to 
decide for the reason that Instruction No 14, delivered 
by the Court to the jury, is as follows: 
''You are instructed that the sole issue in 
this case is a question of whether the defendant 
was negligent as alleged in the plaintiff's com-
plaint, or was not negligent, and if you find and 
believe from a preponderance of the evidence in-
troduced before you, that the defendant, Mrs. 
Emma Cowley, was negligent as defined in these 
instructions, then, you shall render a verdict for 
the plaintiff and against the defendant and de-
termine the amount of his damage, if any; other-
wise if you find that the defendant is not charge-
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able with any aet or aets of negligence alleged 
within the complaint, then yon shall render a 
verdict for the defendant, 'no cause of aetiou'. " 
This Instruction No. 14, limits the issue in the case 
to the question of whether or not the defendant, Mrs. 
Emma Cowley, was negligent. 
B. 
DUTY OF JURY TO FOLLOW COURT'S 
INSTRUCTION 
There can be no argument that it is the duty of a 
court during trial to give instructions to the jury as to 
the issues inYolYed, and that the jury must follow the 
instructions of the court, whether said instructions 
be right or wrong. 
In the case of Ryan vs. Beaver County 82 Utah 27; 
21 Pac (2nd) 858, Justice :Moffat, in writing the opinion 
states: 
"The jury is bound on questions of law to 
yield full obedience to the instructions of the 
court, and this applies as well to that part of the 
charge defining the issues as made by the plead-
ings as to the law as declared by the court and 
made applicable to the evidence as submitted.'' 
In the case of City of Decatur vs. Finley, 127 So. 
518, the Court at page 518 of the Report says: 
''The court erred in its instruction on the 
subject of interest. * * It was the duty of the 
jury nevertheless to follow the court's instruc-
tion.'' 
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In the case of Salter vs. TurnPr, 130 So. 163, the 
Court at page 164 of the Report says : 
"It is essential to an orderly administration of 
justice, that the jury should obey the instructions 
of the court.'' 
In the case of Copeland et al vs. Benson Hardware 
Company, 131 So. 1, the Court at page 2 of the Report 
says: 
"It was the duty of the jury to act in accord 
to the direct instructions of the court, and, fail-
ing so to do, the court properly required this 
action by the jury. It has been well said: 'It is 
essential to an orderly administration of justice 
that juries should obey the instructions of the 
court. If the court is in error in giving instruc-
tions the jury should, nevertheless, obey the in-
structions, and the injured party would have re-
course by appeal to this court, which is the proper 
form to pass upon the actions of the trial court.' '' 
In the case of Redo Y Cia vs. First National Bank 
of Los Angeles, 200 Cal. 161, 252 Pac. 587, the court at 
page 589 of the Report says: 
''It is the province and the duty of the court 
to instruct the jury upon the law, and such in-
structions are binding on the latter in its delib-
erations.'' 
In the case of Farguet vs. De Senti et al, 148 Atl. 
139, the court at page 141 of the Report says: 
''The jury is of course, bound to accept and 
apply principles of law governing the case before 
them.'' 
10 
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In the case of Lol'e l'S. Ft. Dodge, D. 1Jf. and B. R. 
Co., 224 N. W. 815, the court at page 819 of the opinion 
says 
''Courts, and not juries, are to determine 
the law, and, when this is done, it is not for the 
fact-finding body to disregard it.'' 
In the case of lrinston vs. McKnab, 134 Kan. 75, 
4 Pac. (2nd) 401, the Court at page 403 of the Report 
says: 
''Each litigant, the defendant no less than 
the plaintiff, was entitled to an answer to the 
question the jury were impanelled to determine.'' 
In the case of Pfannebecker vs. Southern R. I. & P. 
Ry. Co. 226 N. W. 161, the court at page 162 of the 
opinion says: 
"Right or wrong, instructions must be fol-
lowed, for they become the law of the case. 
'Courts and not juries are to determine the law 
and when this is done, it is not for the factfinding 
body to disregard it.' (Citing Cases)." 
In the case of Louisville and N. R. Co. vs. Muncey, 
17 S. W. (2nd) 423, the court at page 430 of the Report 
says: 
''And an instruction whether right or wrong 
binds the jury, and cannot be disregarded." 
In the case of Cooper vs. Girdler, 39 S. W. (2nd) 
1009, the court at page 1011 of the Report says: 
''It was the duty of the court to base the in-
structions on the pleading and proof, and the duty 
of the jury to follow the instructions. 
11 
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''The eQurt instructed the jury, and properly 
so, upon that issue. The jury disreg.a~ded the 
instructions ; rendered a verdict contrary to the 
instructions. Hence the verdict under the opin-
ions of this court, is contrary to the law (Citing 
Cases). The rule is generally established that 
where a verdict is contrary to the instructions 
it is contrary to law and the court is to be au-
thorized to and it is its duty to, set such a verdict 
aside and grant a new trial.'' 
In the case of Wendel vs. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.~ 
83 Mont. 252, 272 Pac. 245, the court at page 248 of the 
Report says : 
'' The.se instruction~, whether right or wrong, 
stated the law applicable to the case, and should 
hav.e been f.ollowed by the jury in arriving at a 
verdict.'' 
In the case of Thornton et al vs. Wallace et al, 277 
Pac. 417, the court at page 418 .of the Report says : 
''It being clear that the jury disregarded this 
specific instruction, and that the evidence was in-
suffieient to have justified the verdict as ren-
dered, the verdict is 'contrary to law,' and the 
court erred in denying defendant's motion for 
new trial. '' 
In the case of Alexander Drug Co. vs. Whitaker et al, 
146 Okla. 61, 293 Pac. 264, the court at page 266 of the 
Report says : 
"The jury are not permitted to disregard 
the law and the evidence and arbitrate the mat-
ters submitted to them according to their own 
theories of what may be right between the parties, 
which is in reality deciding it merely according to 
their own whim, and in disregard of the evidenec 
given at the trial." 
12 
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In the case of TVestern J.l!ontana Ne;tional Bank l'S: 
Home Insurance Companyl of New York, 75 l\Iont. 1,6, 
241 Pac. 611, the eourt at page 612 of the Report SRys : 
"These instructions became the law of the 
case, and whether right or wrong, were binding 
upon the jury." 
In the rase of Daigle us. Rudbeck, 154 Wash. 536, 
282 Pac. 827, the court at page 828 of the Report says : 
''It was the duty of the jury to follow the law 
as given to it by the trial court and as we have 
seen by the instruction which we have already 
quoted, the jury were told in effect that the plain-
tiff was entitled to receive such sum as would 
fairly and fully compensate him for the injuries 
he might be found to have received. * * * Not 
having done so, it is apparent that the jury erron-
eously disregarded our law and failed to follow 
the court's instruction and therefore there was 
error in the assessment of damages.'' 
c. 
TRIAL COURT ABUSED rrs DLSCRETION IN 
FAILING TO GRANT :MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
It is recognized that a motion for new trial is orig-
inally addressed to the sound discretion Qf the trial 
court, but the contention here is that the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to gr.ant the motion for 
a new trial. 
The Court will remember that this case was tried 
before a jury at the end of which a v·erdict, "no cause 
of action" in favor of defendant had been returned and 
judgment rendered thereon. After this case had gone 
13 
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to the jury, and the jury had retired to the jury room 
for deliberation, certain discussions amongst the 
jurors were heard to include statements as to the negli-
gence of the decedent, William Hale Gribble, and that 
even though the plaintiff was entitled to recover, because 
of the negligence of plaintiff's deceased son, that the 
plaintiff, therefore, was not entitled to recover. State-
ments were also overheard that the decedent had been 
more negligent than the defendant at the scene of the 
accident. There is no contradiction and no proof contra to 
the fact that statements consisting of the element of con-
tributory negligence were discussed within the jury 
room. The affidavits attached to the motion for new 
trial were those of two independent witnesses that had 
overheard the discussions in the jury room, which affi-
davits appear in the abstract at pages 16, 17 and 18, and 
which read as follows : 
"AFFIDAVIT 
"STATE OF UTAH, 
COUNTY OF SAN PETE ss. 
"MRS. GLADYS NIELSON, being first duly 
sworn, upon oath, deposes and says: 
''That on the evening of September 26, 1938, 
at about the hour of 9:30 o'clock P. M. of said 
day, she was walking in company with her sister-
in-law, Mrs. H. M. Gribble, in the Court House 
grounds at the Southwest corner of the County 
Court House, at Manti, Utah, while the jury was 
deliberating in the case of 'H. M. Gribble, plain-
tiff, vs. Mrs. Emma Cowley, defendant,' and that 
during the deliberations of the jury in the above 
entitled case, that she heard statements made 
14 
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within the jury room through the open windows of 
the said jury room in substance and effect as fol-
lows: 
''That eYen though the plaintiff, I-I. l\l. Grib-
ble, was entitled to recover, Hale Gribble was 
more negligent than l\lrs. Cowley at the scene of 
the accident and that the plaintiff because of the 
negligence of said Hale Gribble, was not entitled 
to recover. 
"That statements were likewise made which 
came from said jury room to the effect that Hale 
Gribble had been more negligent than Mrs. Cow-
ley. 
"That statements were made that the cause 
of the accident was the negligence of Hale Grib-
ble turning into the car of Mrs. Emma Cowley. 
(SIGNED) J\IIRS. GLADYS NIELSON 
''Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th 
day of October, 1938. 
(SIGNED) D. E. BORG, 
Notary Public, 
residing at Gunnison.'' 
"AFFIDAVIT 
"STATE OF UTAH, I 
COUNTY OF SAN PETE J ss. 
''~IRS. H. M. GRIBBLE, being first duly 
sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
''That on the evening of September 26, 1938, 
at about the hour of 9:30 o'clock P. M. of said 
day, she was walking in company with her sister-
in-law, Mrs. Gladys Nielson, in the Court House 
grounds at the Southwest corner of the County 
Court House at Manti, Utah, while the jury was 
deliberating in the case of 'H. M. Gribble, plain-
tiff, vs. Mrs. Emma Cowley, defendant,' and that 
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during the deliberations of the jury in the above 
entitled case, that she heard statements made 
within the jury room through the open windows 
of the said jury room in substance and effect as 
follows: 
''That even though the plaintiff, H. M. Grib-
ble, was entitled to recover, Hale Gribble, was 
more negligent than Mrs. Cowley at the scene of 
the accident and that the plaintiff, because of the 
negligence of said Hale Gribble, was not entitled 
to recover. 
''That statements were likewise made which 
came from said jury room to the effect that Hale 
Gribble had been more negligent than Mrs. Cow-
ley. 
"That statements were made that the cause 
of the accident was the negligence of Hale Grib-
ble turning into the car of Mrs. Emma Cowley. 
(SIGNED) MRS. H. M. GRIBBLE. 
''Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th 
day of Octo her, 1938. 
(SIGNED) D. E. BORG, 
Notary Public, 
residing at Gunnison. '' 
Upon the motion for a new trial, the testimony of 
Mrs. Gladys Nielson, Mrs. H. M. Gribble, Alonzo King 
and J. Lawrence Lowry was offered and received by the 
trial court. The matter was then argued to the court, 
and the court then took the same under advisement, 
and on the 19th day of June, 1939, denied the motion for 
a new trial. The view which was taken by the Court, 
I feel is at variance with the authorities for the reason 
that the testimony of Mrs. Gladys Nielson and Mrs. H. 
M. Gribble was very similar to that as has hereinbefore 
been set forth by the affidavits attached to the motion 
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for a new trial, and, in addition, testimony of two jurors 
was offered and received. 
:Mr. Alonzo King, one of the jurors, at the trial of 
this rase, testified as follows: 
''Q. Your name is Alonzo KingY 
''~~. 1les, sir. 
'' Q. And you were one of the jurors duly 
impanelled in the case of H. M. Gribble vs. Mrs. 
Emma Cowley J? 
• • A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. Was there any statement or any dis-
cussion had by and between any of the jurors im-
panelled with reference to the negligence of the 
deceased, William Hale Gribble Y 
''A. 1l es. 
"Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. King, that the dis-
cussion from the time, the bulk of the discussion 
from the time you returned from dinner on that 
evening at the Savoy Hotel was taken up as be-
tween the jurors in discussing the relative items 
of the negligence of Mrs. Cowley as compared 
with the negligence of William Hale Gribble~ 
''A. 1les. 
"Q .. Isn't it a fact, Mr. King, that is al-
most the entire discussion that was had on that 
evening in the jury room~ 
"A. Yes, sir." 
J. Lawrence Lowry, one of the jurors at the trial 
of this case testified as follows: 
'' Q. First of all, I am sorry we had, to call 
you, Mr. Lowry. 1lour name is J. Lawrence 
Lowry1 
''A. 1l es, sir. 
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"Q. You were one of the jurors impanelled 
to hear and did hear the case and render a verdict 
in the case of H. M. Gribble vs. Mrs. Emma 
Cowley? 
''A. I was. 
"Q. As a matter of fact, you were desig-
nated as Foreman of that particular jury, were 
you not1 
''A. I was. 
"Q. I will ask you, Mr. Lowry, if it isn't 
a fact that there was discussion within the jury 
room with reference to the relative negligences 
as between William Hale Gribble and Mrs. Emma 
Cowley on that particular evening 1 
''A. There was some. 
"Q. I will ask you this then: Isn't it a fact 
that most of the time during the deliberations of 
the jury on that particular evening was the dis-
cussion as between the fact that William Hale 
Gribble was negligent and that Mrs. Cowley was 
also negligent, and that William Hale Gribble 
was more negligent than Mrs Cowley was 1 
"A. No, sir, that is not a fact. The most of 
the discussion was as to whether Mrs. Cowley was 
negligent or not. 
'' Q. It is a fact, however, there was a dis-
cussion as to the negligence of William Hale 
Gribblef 
''A. A little discussion, but no ballots 
taken.'' 
There can be little doubt that, according to the adju-
dicated cases, the affidavit of the juror is in no different 
position than that of the testimony of the juror as to 
facts occuring within the jury room during the consider-
ation of the case. 
18 
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The question arises as to what the juror may testify 
to after the decision in any matter. 
In the case of Ogden L. & l. Ry. Co. vs. Jones ef al, 
51 Utah 62; 168 Pac. 3-!8, Chief Justice Frick at page 70 
of the Utah Report says: 
''If a juror is actually guilty of misconduct, 
one or more of the other jurors may testify to the 
facts constituting the alleged misconduct, or the 
same may be proved by any witness who observed 
and knows the facts.'' 
In the case of Moulton l'S. Staats, et al, 83 Utah 197, 
27 Pac. (2nd) 455, District Judge Christensen at page 
458 of the opinion says: 
"From the order it is apparent that there 
was a plain disregard by the jury of the instruc-
tions of the court, which should have satisfied the 
court that the verdict was rendered under a mis-
apprehension of such instructions.'' 
In the case of Farmers' Sav. Bank of Bunch vs. 
Smith, 234 N. W. 798, the Court at page 801 of the Report 
says: 
"We have here a case, however, of assertion 
by jurors of matters as facts not shown by the 
evidence, yet inducing their conclusions and made 
for the purpose of inducing the same conclusion 
in the minds of other jurors. On this record the 
case presented to the trial court was not one for 
the exercise of judicial discretion. It was one on 
which plaintiff was entitled to a new trial as 
matter of right.'' 
Iu the case of Hamilton vs. Snyder, 182 Wash. 688, 
48 Pac. (2nd) 245, the Court at page 246 of the opinion 
says: 
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''Our previous cases upon the subject are 
collated, discussed and considered in Lyberg vs. 
Holz, 145 Wash. 316, 259 P. 1087, and the con-
clusion there reached follows the pronouncement 
of this court in State vs. Parker, supra, and in 
Maryland Casualty Co. vs. Seattle Electric Co., 
75 Wash. 430, 134 P. 1097, to the effect that the 
court may consider the affidavits of jurors so far 
as they state the facts showing misconduct, but 
not as they attempt to show the effect of the mis-
conduct upon the verdict.'' 
In the case of State vs. Parker, 25 Washington 405; 
65 Pac. 776, the Court says: 
"In considering the affidavits filed, we en-
tirely discard those portions which may tend to 
impeach the verdict of the jurors, and consider 
only those facts stated in relation to misconduct 
of the juror, and which in no way inhere in the 
verdict itself. It is not for the juror to say what 
effect the remarks may have had upon his ver-
dict, but he may state facts, and from them the 
court will determine what was the probable effect 
upon the verdict. It is for the court to say whether 
the remarks made by the juror in this case prob-
ably had a prejudical effect upon the minds of 
other jurors. We do not see how any other con-
clusion can be reached than that they were highly 
prejudicial, including, as they did the statement 
of alleged damaging facts concerning appellant 
which had not been introduced in evidence upon 
the trial.'' 
In the case of Ryan vs. Beaver County, 82 Utah 27, 
21 Pac. (2nd) 858; Justice Moffat on page 860 of the 
Pacific Report, cites the case of Jensen vs. Utah Ry. Co., 
72 Utah 366 at page 400; 270 Pac. 349, 362, which states 
as follows: 
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'' HoweYer where the committed error is of 
such nature or ~haracter a8 calculated to do harm, 
or on its face as having the natural tendency to 
do so, prejudice will be presumed, until by the 
record it is affirmatiYely shown that the error 
was not or could not ha,·e been of harmful effect. 
Thus, if the appellant shows committed error of 
such nature or character, he, in the first instance, 
has made a prima facie showing of prejudice. The 
burden, or rather the duty of going forward, is 
then cast on the respondent to show by the record 
that the committed error was not, or could not 
have been, of harmful effect. State vs. Cluff, 48 
Utah, 102, 158 P. 701; Jackson, State et al. vs. 
Feather Rirer & Gibonsville Water Co., 14 Cal. 
19; Thelin vs. Stewart, 100 Cal. 372, 34 P. 861; 
2 Hayne, New Trial and Appeal (2nd Ed.) pp. 
1608-1614. '' 
It is the contention of the appellant that error was 
committed by the jurors when they discussed the ele-
ment of contributory negligence during their jury delib-
erations in this case, and that the testimony of Mrs. 
Gladys Nielson, ::\Irs. H. ~I. Gribble, Alonzo King and 
J. Lawrence Lowry clearly shows that the argument of 
contributory negligence was of such a nature as would 
do harm to the plaintiff's rights, or as Justice Moffat 
has so well said as the citation is taken from the case 
of Jensen 't·s. Utah Ry. Co., supra, that on its face the 
discussion of the item of contributory negligence would 
have a natural tendency to do harm, and it is earnestly 
suggested that prejudice should be presumed as against 
the rights of the plaintiff in this action. Further the 
record does not show that the error was not, or could 
not have been of any harmful effect as there was no 
testimony on the part of the defendant other than the 
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cross examination of the plaintiff's witnesses on the 
motion for new trial. Citations upon the subject could f 
be multiplied almost without end and various cases 
could be brought to the court's attention, but we think 
that the rule is amply set forth by the decisions of our 
own State. 
D. 
THAT THE LAST VOTE OF THE JURORS WAS 
INFLUENCED BY THE INFORMATION SENT TO 
THE JURY BY THE JUDGE IN THE CASE. 
The jury had taken several ballots on attempting 
to reach a verdict in this case, when the jury requested 
along in the early morning of September 27, 1938, that 
the Judge render further instructions in this case. This 
information was obtained on the motion for new trial, 
as follows: 
J. Lawrence Lowry, a witness for the plaintiff on 
motion for new trial, testified as follows : 
"Q. The request was made by the jurors 
in that particular case for further instruction, 
was it not, on that night or the following morn-
ing~ 
''A. Well, we called to inform him we 
weren't together. 
'' Q. Immediately after the discussion on 
the information by which the Judge informed you 
that you would have to read the instructions and 
decide the case thereupon, or something to that 
effect, a jury verdict was reached, was it not~ 
''A. Yes, sir.'' 
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Alonzo King, a witness for the plaintiff on motion 
for new trial, testified on direct examination by :\1 r. 
Beatie, as follows: 
"Q. Was it not a fart that immediately after 
the Court, or immediately after the jury had re-
quested further instructions, or some instruc-
tion from the Judge, that a ballot was taken upon 
this particular verdict, and that it was eight to 
nothing at that time~ 
"A. Yes." 
Alonzo King on cross examination by Mr. Erickson, 
testified, as follows : 
'' Q. You voted in the negative 1 You voted 
with the Gribble's stand up to the last, didn't 
you~ 
''A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. You were the juror that hung out, 
weren't you~ 
''A. I was one of them.'' 
It is earnestly contended that the word sent back 
to the jury in this cause in the early morning hour when 
they requested further instructions from the court, in-
fluenced the jury to such an extent that immediately a 
ballot was taken to get rid of the case, at which time 
the ballot was changed from the previous count of five 
to three, to the final ballot of eight to nothing, and upon 
which verdict the jury then rendered the verdict of ''no· 
cause of action.'' 
When it is looked into and understood that the 
jurors impanelled to try this case were mostly farmers 
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and ranchers, they were very reluctant to sit up all 
night discussing this case in attempting to reach a ver-
dict. When the court advised them to read the instruc-
tions and decide the case, the jurors naturally resented 
that situation for the reason that they had informed the 
Judge that they could not get together, and for that 
reason asked for further instructions with the result 
that it was detrimental and harmful to the plaintiff's 
law suit, so much so that the jury immediately arrived 
at a verdict in order to relieve themselves of any more 
discussion in the early morning hours of September 27, 
1938, such that the jury was wrongfully influenced into 
reaching a verdict without thought as to the facts they 
were to decide the issue upon. 
In conclusion it is submitted that the evidence is 
uncontradicted and clear that the jury discussed an issue 
outside of the realm of their jurisdiction to decide, ac-
cording to the testimony adduced in this case. The ef-
fect which was had upon the jury by reason of discuss-
ing the contributory negligence of William Hale Gribble, 
the deceased, cannot in any way be measured as to what 
influence it had upon any or all of the jurors impanelled 
in this case. It is the belief of the writer of this brief 
that it was wholly through a misapprehension of the 
issues on this case on the part of the jury, that the ques-
tion of contributory negligence was even discussed, for 
it is very seldom that a personal injury case is tried in 
which the defense of contributory negligence is not used, 
and it would be most natural for the jurors to assume 
that the discussion of contributory negligence was a pro-
per element in the case for the reason that laymen might 
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yery easily misunderstand or misconstrue the effect of 
the instructions of the rourt who arts from a legal stand-
point and in which naturally the wording of any instruc-
tion is peculiar to the legal profession and understood by 
it, ·where it might Yery easily be misunderstood by any 
juror impanelled in this, or any other case. 
CONCLUSION 
By way of resume, and in conclusion, the plaintiff 
and appellant submits: 
First: That this court should reverse the judgment 
entered by the trial court in this action because of the 
error of the court committed in the denial of plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial based on the testimony of Mrs. 
Gladys Nielson, l\Irs. H. M. Gribble, Alonzo King and J. 
Lawrence Lowry, showing that contributory negligence 
was discussed in the jury room and that the effect of the 
statement was prejudicial to the plaintiff's cause of 
action. 
Second: Influencing the jury to render a verdict 
when they asked for further instructions and were told 
to read the instructions and decide the case, which re-
sulted in an immediate change in the voting of certain 
jurors who were in favor of a verdict for plaintiff, such 
that their vote was changed to favor the defendant for 
no cause of action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. D. BEATIE, 
25 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
a;nd Appellant. 
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